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Bold claims have been made for democracy and federal adminis-
trative agency notice-and-comment rulemaking, now the dominant
mode of administrative action. An agency's public proposal of a rule
and acceptance of public comment prior to issuing the final rule can
help us view the agency decision as democratic and thus essentially
self-legitimating. "[H]aving administrative agencies set government
policy provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism's
call for deliberative decisionmaking informed by the values of the en-
tire polity."' Moreover, "[r]ulemaking is comprehensible, relatively
quick, and democratically accountable, especially in the sense that
decisionmaking is kept aboveboard and equal access is provided to
all." 2 Rulemaking has been described as "refreshingly democratic" 3
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks for useful comments and
discussion go to Becky Eisenberg, Riyaz Kanji, Sallyanne Payton, Sidney Shapiro, Jonathan
Siegel, Peter Strauss and participants in faculty workshops at Chicago-Kent Law School, the
University of Michigan Law School, and the Northwestern University Law School. Financial
support for this project came from the Cook Fund at the University of Michigan Law School.
1 Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992).
2 KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 269 (4th ed.
2004).
3 Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory
Costs, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 129 (1994).
July 2011 Vol. 79 No. 5
1343
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1343 2010-2011
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
and "the most transparent and participatory decision-making process"
in the government,4 and we are proselytizing worldwide for the
procedure.5
Moreover, technological changes and the advent of e-rulemaking
may have the potential to enhance-perhaps substantially-public un-
derstanding of and involvement in rulemaking. E-rulemaking is the
use of technology to help facilitate public access to and participation
in agency rulemaking.6 With respect to e-rulemaking, reformers hope
for expanded public participation.7  Scholars have commented that
"[p]articipation in rulemaking is one of the most fundamental, impor-
tant, and far-reaching of democratic rights" and that e-rulemaking
represents "online 'deliberative democracy'" 9 with the potential to
"enlarge significantly a genuine public sphere in which individual citi-
zens participate directly" in governmental decisionmaking. 0
4 See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 402 (2011).
5 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process-for Better
or Worse, 34 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2008). Even our government statements describing
rulemaking have placed it on par with legislation in terms of public accountability. In view of
the privacy and safety concerns motivating the rule, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act privacy rule authorized disclosure notwithstanding the rule only if done by a
"legislative or executive body." Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,527 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164). As the
final rule commented, "[f]aw and regulations reflect a clear decision to authorize the particular
disclosure of protected health information, and reflect greater public accountability (e.g.,
through the required public comment process or because enacted by elected representatives)."
Id.
6 The American Bar Association's Committee on the Status and Future of Federal e-
Rulemaking describes e-rulemaking as "the use of technology (particularly, computers and the
World Wide Web) to: (i) help develop proposed rules; (ii) make rulemaking materials broadly
available online ... and (iii) enable more effective and diverse public participation." COMM. ON
THE STATUS & FUTURE OF FED. E-RULEMAKING, AM. BAR Ass'N, ACHIEVING THE POTENTIAL:
THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING 3 (2008) [hereinafter FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING RE-
PORT], available at http://ceri.law.cornell.eduldocuments/report-web-version.pdf.
7 Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55
DUKE L.J. 943, 945 (2006).
8 Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 517
(2004).
9 Lubbers, supra note 5, at 482. As Professor Peter Strauss has commented, we may have
a particular need to find the procedure democratic, given the amount of law that is made
through it. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn't-Attending to Rulemaking's "Democracy
Deficit," 98 CAL. L. REv. 1351, 1351-52 (2010).
10 Peter M. Shane, Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic Exper-
imentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy, 1 I/S: J.L. &
POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'v 147, 148 (2005), available at http://www.is-joumal.orgV01101/I-S,%20V
01-I01-P147,%20Shane.pdf, quoted in Coglianese, supra note 7, at 947 (reviewing DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
(Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003)).
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E-rulemaking can, for example, permit the public to more readily
view the identity of commenters to the agencies and the content of
comments. E-rulemaking can "enhance public participation . . . so as
to foster better regulatory decisions . . . and greater support for those
decisions by more involved regulatory and beneficiary communi-
ties."" Indeed, public participation, already extensive in some high-
visibility, high-salience rulemakings, may be further increased by e-
rulemaking. 12 A 2008 blue-ribbon panel report to Congress and the
President indicated that "comment activity on regulations.gov has
been increasing at a very encouraging rate."13
Levels of participation in rulemaking are very occasionally star-
tling. The Fish and Wildlife Service's rulemaking on whether to list
the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species
Act attracted approximately 670,000 comments, including roughly
43,000 letters and postcards and 627,000 e-mails. 14 In its 2003
rulemaking on media ownership rules, permitting more consolidation
of broadcast ownership in a particular market, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") received over one million comments,
99.9% of which were opposed to the rules.15 (The FCC adhered to its
position.) As of July 2011, four recent rulemakings posted on regula-
tions.gov had prompted over 10,000 public comments each, with one
prompting over 60,000 comments. 16 At the same time, however, many
rulemakings garner few, if any, comments.
As the prominence of administrative rulemaking-and e-
rulemaking-as a means of creating policy increases, it is critical that
we thoroughly consider what potential rulemaking may in fact have to
make agency decisionmaking democratically responsive. These claims
also warrant further examination because other ideas regarding how
the administrative state might be considered democratically legiti-
mate, including control by Congress or the President, have been sub-
jected to sharp criticism. The extent of participation and the usability,
11 FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
12 See Coglianese, supra note 7, at 952-53.
13 FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 & n.19 ("[Albout 295,000 docu-
ments [were] submitted by public users via regulations.gov in the first eight months of 2008, as
compared with about 114,000 in the last eight months of 2007.").
14 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status
for the Polar Bear (Ursa maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,235 (May 15,
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
15 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Politi-
cal Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 908 (2006).
16 See REGULATIONS.Gov, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited July 2, 2011) (follow
"Your Voice in Action: Site Data" hyperlink).
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transparency, and accessibility of e-rulemaking dockets are obvious
issues, and they have received some attention in the 2008 blue-ribbon
panel report.17
In contrast to participation issues, the question of what agency
officials do with the information they get from the public has received
far less attention. To implement their responsibilities, agencies typi-
cally must resolve value-laden questions in addition to more technical
and scientific questions. A significant number of public comments re-
ceived by agencies seem to relate to these questions of value or policy.
But agency officials appear to be discounting these value-laden com-
ments, even when they are numerous.
This should raise significant concerns. If agencies are in fact sys-
tematically discounting these comments, it could undermine the po-
tential of public rulemaking to serve as a source of democratic
accountability. Agencies of course ought not formalistically treat pub-
lic comments as a dispositive "vote." But discounting these comments
as inconsistent with a notion of rulemaking as a "technocratically ra-
tional" enterprise is also deeply problematic given the value-laden na-
ture of many agency decisions and the democratic claims made for
rulemaking. This Foreword is meant as an initial foray into the ques-
tion of what agencies should do with mass public comments, particu-
larly on broad questions of policy.
Part I discusses the extent to which congressional control, presi-
dential control, and agency procedures themselves can ensure that
agency decisions are democratically responsive. In view of shortcom-
ings in both congressional and presidential control, I underscore the
need to focus closely on rulemaking procedures as a source of demo-
cratic responsiveness. The possibility that agencies may be systemati-
cally discounting certain public submissions raises difficulties, and I
present some examples. Part II makes a preliminary case that agen-
cies should more thoroughly consider public policy and values com-
ments. Public comments filed with an agency in reaction to a concrete
proposal would seem to have considerable potential as a source of
information on citizen values and preferences. The presence of signif-
icant and numerous public comments in a rulemaking might at least
trigger further investigation and deliberation by an agency. Alterna-
17 See Farina et al., supra note 4, at 396 (noting the need to focus on "the right mix of
technology, content, and human assistance to support users in the unfamiliar environment of
complex government policymaking"). See generally FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra
note 6.
1346 [Vol. 79:1343
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tively, agencies should more candidly and publicly acknowledge that
participation in rulemaking can serve only a limited function.
I. AGENCIES, MODERN STATUTORY DELEGATIONS,
AND DEMOCRACY
What it might take to consider the American administrative state
legitimate remains a persistent question. Although it exercises consid-
erable power to make law and adjudicate cases in addition to imple-
menting statutory programs, this "fourth branch of government" is
not mentioned in the Constitution and its officials are not popularly
elected. Moreover, it has been clear for many decades that agencies
do not simply function as repositories of technical expertise, filling in
minor details of statutory schemes while elected officials make the
critical policy decisions. If this were so, agency authority, even with
respect to rulemaking, could be seen as sharply constrained by statu-
tory schemes, with agencies functioning as largely neutral technical
experts.
The reality of modern statutory delegations, however, has re-
quired the abandonment of the view that agencies are "transmission
belts," merely applying their technical expertise to well-specified stat-
utory questions. Statutory delegations to agencies are now far too
broad to sustain any claim that all-or even most-critical policy deci-
sions are being made by Congress, the most democratic branch of gov-
ernment.18 Rather, agency officials receive broad powers to resolve
not only questions requiring substantial technical expertise, but also
questions that can only be understood as value-laden. One might
characterize these decisions not as an exercise of expertise, but of
judgment.
Agencies are the institutions tasked with deciding, for example,
not only whether a particular drug is "safe," but also how safe a drug
must be to reach the U.S. market, how much contamination a food
may contain consistent with the "protection of public health," 19 and
18 It is now well settled that the nondelegation doctrine presents no significant obstacle to
Congress broadly delegating rulemaking authority to agencies. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). Some have suggested that it is simply too tempting for Con-
gress to take credit for solving a problem through a statutory delegation, particularly because it
preserves the ability of Congress to blame the agency if something ultimately goes wrong. See
generally Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56-57 (1982) (discussing various explanations, including pub-
lic choice explanations, that members of Congress, in delegating, may be able to shift a "prepon-
derantly large part of the blame" to the agency if something goes wrong).
19 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2006).
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what level of air pollution is "requisite to protect the public health" or
environment with "an adequate margin of safety." 2 0 As of 2010, agen-
cies will soon be responsible under new financial reform legislation for
defining substantial aspects of the extent of consumer protections and
investment restrictions in the banking industry.21 This responsibility
will require a new agency, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protec-
tion, to balance, for example, risks and benefits to consumers, banks,
and other entities that provide financial products.22 By dint of these
broad delegations, the decisions that agencies make very often involve
both significant technical questions (how much will reducing arsenic in
drinking water reduce the risk of cancer?) and significant questions of
value (how much risk to health is tolerable?; how much risk can an
unsophisticated borrower reasonably bear?; at what point do risks to
consumers warrant loss of access to a particular sort of financial prod-
uct?). Often, an agency must balance multiple goals. In the context of
national forest management, for example, the U.S. Forest Service is
authorized by statute to create and administer a national forest in or-
der to "to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries" while
simultaneously "furnish[ing] a continuous supply of timber for the use
and necessities of citizens." 23 The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") must regulate hazardous air pollutants in a way that achieves
the "maximum degree of reduction in emissions of" the pollutant,
while still considering whether reduction is "achievable" in view of its
cost and feasibility.24
Given the range of questions agencies must resolve, legitimacy
for their actions has become a function of both accountability and
democratic responsiveness. When an agency's authority is meaning-
20 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
21 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2010, at Al ("Regulators are charged with deciding how much money banks
have to set aside against unexpected losses, so the Financial Services Roundtable, which repre-
sents large financial companies, and other banking groups have been making a case to the regu-
lators that squeezing too hard would hurt the economy."); see also Farina et al., supra note 4, at
400 ("Both health care reform and the financial crisis have led to massive new federal regulatory
responsibilities . . .. [T]he job of actually solving the problems ... is delegated to Executive
agencies and independent regulatory commissions.").
22 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512) (discuss-
ing the Bureau's consideration of "potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered per-
sons" in issuing rules).
23 Christopher Cumings, Comment, Judicial Iron Triangles: The Roadless Rule to No-
where-and What Can Be Done to Free the Forest Service's Rulemaking Process, 61 OKLA. L.
REv. 801, 801 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
1348 [Vol. 79:1343
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fully constrained, an agency can be seen as accountable for acting in a
constrained, nonarbitrary way.2 5  To be accountable, the agency
should be obligated to disclose and justify its actions in light of its
constraints and suffer consequences on the basis of its performance. 26
Judicial review of agency action makes agencies accountable for acting
lawfully and nonarbitrarily, within the limits set by statute.27 The elec-
toral process can also be an important source of accountability when,
for example, elected officials are removed by voters for their failure to
adequately control the lawless or arbitrary behavior of agencies.
Beyond this sort of accountability, agency decisions, to be legiti-
mate, also must be democratically responsive. To the extent Congress
has made critical policy choices in a statute delegating authority to an
agency, judicial review can ensure that agencies comply with the stat-
ute consistent with congressional policy decisions. Otherwise, the ju-
diciary is limited in its ability to ensure that agencies are
democratically responsive. More often, an agency must make value-
laden decisions without significant guidance from the statute that au-
thorizes the decisions, necessarily limiting the usefulness of judicial
review.28 Many of these value-laden decisions are outside the realm of
scientific and technical expertise that traditionally resides within ad-
ministrative agencies. The difficulty: as then-Professor Elena Kagan
commented, agency officials have "neither democratic warrant nor
special competence to make the value judgments-the essentially po-
litical choices-that underlie most administrative policymaking." 2 9
If Congress-the most democratic branch-does not make key
policy or values decisions in statutes that constrain agency actions,3 0
25 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (2003) ("The presidential control model
misleads us into thinking that [political] accountability is all we need to assure ourselves that
agency action is constitutionally valid. . . . I suggest that a focus on the avoidance of arbitrary
agency decisionmaking lies at the core of ... a theoretical justification of administrative legiti-
macy . . . ."); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,
103 MIcH. L. REV. 2073, 2119 (2005).
26 See Rubin, supra note 25, at 2119.
27 See Bressman, supra note 25, at 472-73; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political"
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1134 (2010).
28 See, e.g., Schurz Commc'ns, Inc., v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.)
("So nebulous a mandate invests the Commission with an enormous discretion and correspond-
ingly limits the practical scope of responsible judicial review."). Judges do, of course, enforce the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and other statutes, and
review agency decisions for their essential reasonableness under the APA's "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard. See infra Part II.
29 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353 (2001).
30 The judiciary could, of course, enforce procedural requirements meant to ensure that
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how might agency decisions nonetheless be understood as "democrati-
cally responsive"? Generally, a government action might be charac-
terized as democratically responsive to the extent it reflects and
expresses the popular will. Pluralist and civic republican theories of-
fer influential alternative views of this notion. Under a pluralist con-
ception, a government decision might be seen as democratic to the
extent the government institution hears from and considers-even
reconciles-a wide variety of interests. The electoral process, in the-
ory, can serve this function directly, for both the President and Con-
gress, and derivatively, for the agencies that respond to Congress and
the President. (I turn to the caveats shortly.)
A particular agency decision also might be seen as democratic in
the pluralist sense-indeed, as a microcosm of the legislative pro-
cess-to the extent the agency hears and considers a wide variety of
interests. If the relevant interests are fully represented in the agency
process, the agency might function as a broker, much like Congress
serving as a broker among interest groups in pluralist theories of legis-
latures.3 1 As Professor Richard Stewart has pointed out, some ele-
ments of administrative law could be understood to enhance the
possibility that agency procedures are effectively pluralist. 32 For ex-
ample, the public right to comment in rulemaking and judicial recog-
nition of broad standing in suits against agencies both might be
understood to "facilitat[e] input from affected interests" 33 and mini-
mize the danger that one or a few factions would inappropriately in-
fluence the process.34
The other leading alternative is the civic republican view, which
sees governmental decisionmaking as legitimate to the extent it facili-
tates and responds to democratic deliberation. In contrast to pluralist
theories, which conceptualize the public interest as an aggregation of
preferences of stakeholder groups, these deliberative democracy theo-
ries conceptualize the public interest as the result of a democratic dia-
agencies engage the public in deciding individual matters. See infra notes 36-37 and accompany-
ing text.
31 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1667, 1683 (1975); see also id. at 1670 ("Increasingly, the function of administrative law is
not the protection of private autonomy but the provision of a surrogate political process to en-
sure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative
decision.").
32 See id. at 1679 (noting that these elements might "serve[] as partial substitute for politi-
cal safeguards").
33 Id.
34 See also David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 121-23 (2000).
1350 [Vol. 79:1343
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logue in which citizens fully disclose their interests and are open to
hearing others' reasons and revisiting their own views.35 The electoral
process for Congress and the President might be characterized as
democratically deliberative. Alternatively, the institution's internal
decisionmaking could be characterized as deliberative. Under either
view, agency decisions would be considered democratically responsive
to the extent they are made responsively to Congress and the White
House.
Some also have tried to characterize agency rulemaking itself as a
site of civic republican democratic deliberation. As Professor Mark
Seidenfeld has argued,36 notice-and-comment rulemaking might be
seen as facilitating a democratic dialogue because the public is entitled
to participate and because the agency is required to explain its reason-
ing and answer significant comments. 37 Civic republican advocates
have acknowledged, however, that because the comment period is
short, a commenter has little chance to participate directly in dialogue
or be persuaded during the rulemaking itself that the ultimate result
serves the public interest.38 The result of such a process could none-
theless be theorized as serving the public interest if agency staff are
thought to act as agents of constituent stakeholders in a dialogue on
what serves the public interest. 39
To summarize, if agencies must decide values and policy ques-
tions left unresolved by their authorizing statutes, three other sources
35 Mark Seidenfeld, The Quixotic Quest for a "Unified" Theory of the Administrative State,
6 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 4-6 (2005), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art2.
36 See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1559-60.
37 Section 553 of the APA requires an agency to provide public notice of a proposed rule
and a "concise general statement of ... basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). The judicial
gloss on APA requirements has also resulted in agencies being required to respond to the sub-
stance of significant comments received during rulemaking. See United States v. Nova Scotia
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
38 See Seidenfeld, supra note 35, at 5 ("[S]takeholders themselves are too impassioned and
poorly informed to expect them to change preferences in the short period during which regula-
tory controversies get resolved.").
39 See id. at 4-6. One hope that some scholars have for e-rulemaking is that it will realize
a potential for even greater deliberation on agency decisions because individuals can comment
more easily and have a greater opportunity to read and react to each other's comments. See
BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: How TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE GOVERNMENT
BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL 41 (2009) (suggesting that e-
rulemaking could lead to democratic dialogue among interested individuals). It is necessary to
note, however, that e-rulemaking remains a work in progress on this score. For example, some
agencies, despite legal requirements, are "failing to post many significant rulemaking materials-
including submitted comments. As a result, the publicly accessible portion of the database is not
complete and the e-dockets for many agencies are not in fact authoritative . . . ." FEDERAL E-
RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
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might provide the information, the control, or the incentives to
prompt agencies to make democratically responsive decisions,
whether in a pluralist or civic republican sense. These are presidential
oversight, informal congressional oversight, and agency processes
themselves. Both presidential oversight and informal congressional
oversight have some important shortcomings, however. That under-
scores the appropriateness of a close focus on agency processes that
directly engage the public.
A. Presidential and Congressional Oversight
Consider, first, presidential oversight. Much recent scholarship
has focused on the potential of presidential control to ensure that
agencies exercise their discretion in a way that is democratically ac-
countable and legitimate. 4 0 Presidents can remove poorly performing
agency heads or influence individual decisions, as they currently do
through the regulatory review process.41 In addition to being ener-
getic leaders, as Alexander Hamilton argued, 42 presidents are more
likely to take a national perspective compared to members of Con-
gress, as Professor Jerry Mashaw has contended, because the Presi-
dent may be less focused on distributing pork to narrow interest
groups or "home state" constituents. 43 Following Professor Mashaw's
argument, this makes presidents particularly well suited to oversee
major decisions made by the administrative state.
As Professors Cynthia Farina and Evan Criddle, among others,
have recently pointed out, however, the presidential election process,
focused as it often is on swing states, may not be sufficient to prompt
the President to take the national perspective envisioned by Professor
40 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw 152 (1997); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments
for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35 (1995); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) [hereinafter
Mashaw, Prodelegation]. Whether presidential control blunts potential negative effects of inter-
est groups in the agencies or instead provides another opportunity for interest group pressure is
the subject of some debate. See generally Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presi-
dential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821 (2003).
41 See Mendelson, supra note 27, at 1132-33; Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative
Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 947 (1980).
42 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
43 Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 40, at 95 ("The president has no particular constitu-
ency to which he or she has special responsibility to deliver benefits.").
[Vol. 79:13431352
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Mashaw.44 Even assuming that the President is likely to take the na-
tional view, and further assuming that voters are engaged and in-
formed on issues of relevance to administrative agency policies,
presidential elections are infrequent and voter choices are sharply lim-
ited, typically to a very few candidates, each of whom may hold a com-
plex set of policy positions.45  At the outset then, even if voter
preferences are well formed, a President's preferences may not corre-
spond well to national preferences, particularly on individual matters
of regulatory policy. Even an impending reelection campaign will
have its limits as a source of electoral accountability for agency
decisions.
Moreover, voter preferences are often far from well formed. On
a wide array of issues the President will face, voter views are inchoate
at the time of an election, leaving the President without any possibility
of a mandate or even a clear sense of national preferences on a given
issue.46 To develop a sense of the popular will, even in a pluralist
sense, a President must continue to engage the public outside the elec-
toral process, going beyond understanding the national preferences at
the time of an election.
Once the President is in office, however, the institution of the
Presidency may not necessarily engage an especially wide range of
views, particularly without the discipline imposed by an upcoming
election. 4 7 Of course, any political official is free to consult polls, citi-
zens, and interest groups and will have to contend with other political
institutions, as the President does with Congress. Moreover, the Pres-
ident is likely to have an incentive to consider more than just the in-
terests of one state or region.48 But the electoral process and the
necessity of negotiating with Congress are likely to provide the Presi-
dent with only a partial incentive to consult the wide range of views
44 See Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Informa-
tion Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 391-92 (2010) ("[W]hat
cannot be disputed is [the Electoral College's] success in focusing the attention of would-be
Presidents on geography.").
45 See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 459 (2010); Farina, supra note 44, at 383.
46 See Criddle, supra note 45, at 458 (arguing that presidential elections do not confer
regulatory mandates).
47 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 56 (James Madison) (explaining why members of the House of
Representatives need not know every detail of their district to be effective).
48 Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 40, at 95 ("[Ilssues of national scope ... are the
essence of presidential politics.").
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one might think necessary for "democratic responsiveness" under ei-
ther a pluralist or civic republican view. 49
Further, although presidential influence over agency action is in-
disputably present, if not always consistent,50 the content of that influ-
ence is generally unknown. For example, as I have documented
elsewhere, agency rules undergoing executive review in the Clinton
and second Bush Administrations were changed at very high rates,
and in the Obama Administration, that rate has reached over ninety
percent for significant rules." Information regarding the content of
those changes, however, is extraordinarily limited.5 2 Because Presi-
dents may try to maintain deniability with respect to agency action,
the lack of transparency impairs the ability even of engaged voters to
hold the President accountable for agency action.53 All of these fea-
tures limit the Presidency as a source of democratic responsiveness
and accountability for the administrative state.
What about Congress? Assuming that Congress has not an-
swered the pertinent policy or values questions by passing or amend-
ing an agency's authorizing statute, Congress has other more or less
effective means of influencing the administrative state. These include
budgetary control and informal influence through hearings and corre-
spondence with an agency.
Either on a pluralist or a civic republican theory of democracy,
Congress may have an advantage over the Presidency in collecting and
reconciling the views of a wide range of groups. This is due not only
to Congress's size, but also its quality as a regional institution. Some
have suggested that this results in more of a focus by individual mem-
bers of Congress on "pork,"54 but local interests and local values may
also be more likely to play a part in congressional elections compared
with presidential elections.55  Meanwhile, the President is not free
from the pressure to deliver special benefits; it is just that those pres-
49 In overseeing the administrative state, the President will of course have some incentive
to respond to Congress, because Congress can revise the terms of delegation or cut the budget.
As noted, however, congressional oversight of administrative issues has tended to be infrequent
and ad hoc. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
50 See Mendelson, supra note 27, at 1146-47.
51 Id. at 1149-51.
52 Id. at 1149-54.
53 See id. at 1159-63. I have elsewhere argued for the importance of at least some disclo-
sure of the content of executive supervision. Id.
54 MAsHAw, supra note 40, at 152.
55 See LAWRENCE R. JACOBs & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLMCIANs DON'T PANDER 33
(2000).
1354 [Vol. 79:1343
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1354 2010-2011
2011] RULEMAKING, DEMOCRACY, AND TORRENTS OF E-MAIL 1355
sures relate to areas where the votes may swing.56 In other words,
Congress in its entirety may have the potential-arguably broader
than that of the Presidency-to engage a relatively wide range of
American views. Nonetheless, the congressional process suffers from
its own shortcomings. Many members of Congress come from "safe"
districts, limiting the prospects for meaningful dialogue during an
election campaign, and voter views on particular topics are at least as
likely to be ill formed at the time of a congressional election as a pres-
idential election. So members of Congress, like the President, may be
able only to form a very limited sense of the popular will at the time of
election.
On a deliberative view, congressional deliberation again may
have some advantages over White House deliberation, simply because
the discussants are likely to convey and engage a wider range of views.
On the other hand, much of this deliberation, in a setting short of
amending authorizing legislation, is conducted by submajoTities of
Congress, such as committees that hold oversight hearings. Such sub-
majorities may not be representative of the full Congress.57 I have
argued elsewhere, however, that such submajority views can be impor-
tant sources of information on value to agencies.58 The biggest diffi-
culty with Congress is that congressional oversight of administrative
decisionmaking is often limited, infrequent, and ad hoc rather than
systematic.59
56 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
57 Although the idealistic notion of committees is a smaller body representative of the
whole that has an opportunity to develop expertise, committees have been criticized as being
composed of "preference outliers" who seek committee membership in order to distribute bene-
fits to their constituents or to well-organized interest groups. But Professor Keith Krehbiel has
compiled statistical evidence suggesting that committees are not, in fact, composed of preference
outliers. Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84
Am. POL. Sci. REv. 149, 155 (1990).
58 Nina Mendelson, Midnight Rulemaking and Congress, in TRANSITIONs (Austin Sarat
ed., forthcoming 2011).
59 Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46
ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 10 (1994) (even as oversight has become more popular, "monitoring and
reporting only reveals what an agency is doing; these activities do not automatically cause the
agency to adhere to, or alter, a policy"); Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59
EMORY L.J. 369, 420 (2009) ("The fundamental problem with fire alarm oversight, however, is
that it ignores arbitrary decision making by Executive Branch agencies that escapes the attention
of well-organized interest groups."). See generally Mendelson, supra note 58.
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B. Agency Rulemaking Procedures as a Source of Information on
Public Values
Given the patchy and incomplete nature of congressional and
presidential influence over agencies, the recent scholarly focus on the
rulemaking process itself is more than justified. To what extent can
agency rulemaking procedures aid agencies in ensuring that their deci-
sions can be seen as democratic? 60
By rulemaking, I mean the familiar process for informal notice-
and-comment rulemaking set forth in section 553 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act ("APA"). An agency must publish advance notice
and take public comment prior to finalizing a legally binding rule. 61
As a result of judicial interpretation of section 553's requirements, an
agency also must publicly disclose the data on which it is relying prior
to seeking comment and must explain its reasons for rejecting signifi-
cant comments. 62 Finally, a judge may vacate the agency decision if it
is not reasoned, does not follow substantive legal requirements in the
authorizing statute or in the APA, or if it is arbitrary or capricious. 63
These requirements ensure to some degree that agencies are account-
able for following the law (including implementing any critical value
choices Congress may have made in the authorizing statute) and for
acting in a nonarbitary fashion.64 They also codify an entitlement to
public participation and to at least some public reason-giving from the
agency. As noted, Professor Stewart has argued that these opportuni-
ties for groups or individuals to register their views and supply infor-
60 Even if agency rulemaking procedures can be seen as democratically legitimate, sub-
stantial questions remain regarding the legitimacy of agency adjudication as a policymaking
method. Longstanding judicial doctrine confirms an agency's ability to use adjudication, as well
as rulemaking, to resolve policy matters. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
294 (1974). Nonetheless, agency adjudication is beyond the scope of this Foreword. Because
rulemaking is now the dominant method used by agencies to resolve issues, this article follows
the lead of other scholarship in focusing only on rulemaking. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cul-
lar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 428-29 (2005) ("Notice and com-
ment deserves close attention in a study of regulatory democracy because the bulk of regulation
is crafted through that procedure today .
61 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
62 ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.3d 1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring response to significant
comments); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977)
(requiring disclosure of scientific data relied upon); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring disclosure of technical data or studies in time to
allow for meaningful comment); see also Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227,
246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting the "shaky
legal foundation" of the Portland Cement doctrine because it lacks textual foundation in the
APA).
63 5 U.S.C. § 706.
64 See Bressman, supra note 25, at 463.
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mation to the agency can help turn agency decisionmaking in a more
pluralist direction. 65 Professor Seidenfeld has suggested that the par-
ticipation opportunities, coupled with the obligation on agencies to
give reasons, can enable agency decisionmaking to function in a civic
republican manner. 66
One possible ground for criticism of these theories of rulemaking
as intrinsically democratic is that even if the process is useful, public
participation is skewed. Although the right to notice and the opportu-
nity to submit written comments in agency rulemaking extends to
every member of the public, the reality is that actual participation in
rulemaking is not well balanced. Regulated entities tend to be heavily
represented in rulemaking, compared with regulatory beneficiaries-
those who expect to benefit from a regulatory program. Professor
Wendy Wagner has documented, for example, that business groups
substantially dominated comments in a rulemaking on hazardous air
pollutants.67 Professors Jason and Susan Webb Yackee reached simi-
lar results in a study of forty midsized rulemakings. 68 In several stud-
ies of run-of-the-mill rulemakings, "[f]ew of these comments ever
came from ordinary citizens."69 However, there are occasional excep-
tions, where rules are so salient and visible that "comments from the
lay public make up the vast majority of total comments."7 0
One reason that business groups dominate rulemaking participa-
tion is that although the right to participate in rulemaking is clear,
participation is not cost free. It takes resources to uncover the exis-
65 See Stewart, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
66 See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1515-16.
67 Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1382, 1386 (2010); see also CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How Gov-
ERNMENT AGENCIES WRfE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 188 (2d ed. 1999); NOVECK, supra note 39,
at 131.
68 In a set of rulemakings that excluded those with more than 200 comments, Professors
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee found that business interests submitted over 57%
of the comments; of nonbusiness groups, public interest groups provided only 6% of total com-
ments. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest
Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 131, 133 (2006).
69 Coglianese, supra note 7, at 951 (discussing his own studies as well as studies conducted
by Professors Marissa Golden and William West). The studies addressed rulemakings by the
EPA, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Id. One study of EPA and NHTSA rules from the
1990s found that "[b]usinesses dominated ... filing 77 percent of all comments." Id. at 952
(citing Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 253-54 (1998) (discussing
studies conducted by Professor Golden which indicated that in the HUD rulemakings she stud-
ied, governmental entities contributed "75 percent of all the comments submitted").
70 Cu6l1ar, supra note 60, at 414.
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tence of a rulemaking, to understand the issues at stake, and to pre-
pare persuasive comments.71 As has long been observed, due to the
free rider problem, groups representing interests diffusely spread
among large groups of individuals face greater challenges to organiz-
ing than smaller groups where interests are more concentrated.72 In
the context of rulemaking specifically, diffuse regulatory beneficiaries
face "substantial impediments to participating in costly rulemak-
ings." 73 In the setting of health, safety, and environmental regulation,
for example, regulated entities (consider automobile manufacturers
and operators of coal-fired electric utilities) tend to be more concen-
trated, while regulatory beneficiaries (consider drivers and tap water
drinkers) tend to be more diffuse and thus more often
underrepresented.74
In addition, regulated entities possess greater control of certain
types of information, such as cost and feasibility, that may be espe-
cially valuable to agencies. That may prompt agencies to be particu-
larly attentive to regulated entity comments.75 Regulated entities also
may be better able than regulatory beneficiaries to deluge agencies
with information, distracting them from comments submitted by other
groups.76
71 FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 ("Extracting and understanding
information embedded in reams of studies, analyses and other relevant documents is inherently
time-consuming and often difficult for those without both substantive and legal expertise.").
72 See MANCUR OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 5-65 (1971); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGAN-
IZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 171-72 (1986); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL OR-
GANIZATIONs 33-35 (1973) (describing incentives, including solidary and purposive, that may
cause individuals to join groups); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS
OF REGULATION 357, 366-70 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (describing circumstances under which
groups are likely to organize); see also Seidenfeld,, supra note 35, at 1-2.
73 Wagner, supra note 67, at 1326. Professors Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb
Yackee similarly concluded that rulemaking costs appear to "remain sufficiently high that indi-
vidual citizens and public interest groups remain disadvantaged." Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, supra note 68, at 133; see also LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERo, LINKING CITIZENS TO
GOVERNMENT: INTEREST GROUP POLrTICS AT COMMON CAUSE 266 (1992) ("The claim that
there exists a brave new world of organizations that constitutes a strong, countervailing repre-
sentation of the public will must be viewed with considerable hesitancy.").
74 Rulemaking "is typically dominated by a limited range of participants who have the
resources and expertise to obtain, comprehend and formulate an effective comment on the infor-
mation crucial to the agency's proposal." FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
75 Wagner, supra note 67, at 1380-81.
76 Id. at 1333. That may further dilute the relative influence of diffuse groups. See id.
Professors Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee concluded, however, that although
agencies in their study seemed more responsive to business groups, this responsiveness could not
be explained by greater information content in the comments supplied by business groups. Jason
Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, supra note 68, at 137.
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E-rulemaking may reduce the imbalance in participation some-
what, because it reduces the cost both of identifying proposed agency
rules and of submitting comments, compared with monitoring the
Federal Register and filing paper comments.77 One scholar has sug-
gested, however, that for rulemakings that are already high visibility,
e-rulemaking may simply increase the size of the "bounce" in public
participation, rather than the range of interests represented.7 8 In any
event, reducing the imbalance in public participation has already oc-
cupied the attention of some commentators. 79
At least as significant a problem, however, and one that has re-
ceived far less attention, is what agency officials do with the views the
agency receives in rulemaking. An agency's dismissal or pro forma
treatment of significant numbers of public comments would be very
hard to square with a vision of rulemaking as a democratic process.80
In fact, a preliminary look suggests that agencies appear to treat tech-
nically and scientifically oriented comments far more seriously than
what we might call value-laden or policy-focused comments. A num-
ber of observers have commented that the primary focus of rulemak-
ing documents has been the issues that are framed in more technical
or scientific terms, even if, as Professor Emily Meazell and others
77 Enabling commenters to more easily comment on each other's comments may also be in
the offing; the Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative is currently piloting such discussion on a highly
limited set of rules. See REGULATION Room, www.regulationroom.org (last visited June 12,
2011); see also NOVECK, supra note 39, at 149-56 (discussing the use of internet communication
and collaboration to enhance deliberative process of rulemaking). Regarding the level of partic-
ipation, compare J. Woody Stanley & Christopher Weare, The Effects of Internet Use on Political
Participation, 36 ADMIN. & Soc. 503, 504 (2004) (suggesting that e-rulemaking will be used pri-
marily by individuals and groups already active in rulemaking), and Coglianese, supra note 7, at
943 ("[E]mpirical research shows that e-rulemaking makes little difference: citizen input remains
typically sparse, notwithstanding the relative ease with which individuals can now learn about
and comment on regulatory proposals."), with FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6,
at 13 n.19 (finding level of participation encouraging).
78 Coglianese, supra note 7, at 952-58.
79 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Pro-
cess, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 132 (1998) (discussing imbalance in "financial constraints" among
participants in rulemaking, and noting that a Senate Committee found that "regulated industries
spend from ten to one hundred times as much as public interest groups do in rulemaking and
adjudication proceedings"); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study
of EPA's Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 108-10 (2011) (noting "system-
atic biases that favor regulated parties in rules promulgated by several different agencies," and
discussing "systematic skews in the practical accessibility of the rulemaking process to the full
range of affected stakeholders").
80 One other pathway to democratic responsiveness could be congressional awareness that
an agency has ignored extensive public comments. As discussed above, however, congressional
oversight is so limited and ad hoc that this is not likely to be a substantial incentive for the
agency to consider those comments.
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have noted, "agency science . . . is laced with policy decisions at nu-
merous levels.""' Agencies frequently cloak their resolution of values
issues in their resolution of scientific and technical issues.8 2
Public comments go far beyond scientific and technical issues,
however. Professor Mariano-Florentino Cu611ar has most extensively
inventoried the range of comments on three rules generating high
volumes of comments promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, the Federal Election Commission, and the Treasury Depart-
ment. 3 He characterizes relatively sophisticated comments as those
revealing an awareness of statutory constraints faced by agencies, pro-
viding either concrete examples or "discrete logical arguments," and
supplying "legal, policy, or empirical background."84 These are the
sorts of comments likely to be filed by well-organized groups or insti-
tutions who can enlist attorneys and technical experts to help them
formulate comments.
Anyone can file a comment, of course, and comments from indi-
viduals can be and sometimes are 5 sophisticated in this same way,
"using the kind of complex argumentation to which agency staff claim
to pay the most attention."8 6 But comments from laypersons also can
be unsophisticated, ranging from a description of the commenter's
personal experience to little more than a simple preference for a par-
ticular outcome. 7 One comment submitted in 2009 on an EPA pro-
posed rule to reduce interstate transport of fine particulate matter and
ozone stated, "I strongly commend your proposal to more stringently
regulate coal-fired power plants and in two simple words urge you to
'hang tough', as the coal people will fight you tooth and nail."88 An-
other comment on the same rule stated, "[i]t is long overdue that ...
EPA actions reduce sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and particulate
81 Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review
of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 736 (2011) ("[I]nterested parties and agencies alike
are incentivized to cloak their policy choices in the seemingly unassailable mantle of science.").
82 Id.; see Wagner, supra note 67, at 1359.
83 See Cudllar, supra note 60, at 429.
84 Id. at 431. Professor Cudllar devised these criteria based on interviews with lawyers and
agency policy officials. He included two additional criteria as well: whether the commenter "in-
clude[d] at least a paragraph of text providing a particular interpretation of, and indicating an
understanding of, the statutory requirement," and whether the commenter "propose[d] an ex-
plicit change in the regulation provided in the notice of proposed rulemaking." Id.
85 See id. at 414, 487.
86 Id. at 414.
87 See id. at 430.
88 Donnie Dann, Comment on Proposed Rule: Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, REGULATIONS.Gov, http://www.regu-
lations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0491-0169 (last visited June 12, 2011).
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matter as much as possible. I see that [a study] . . . show[s] the new
regulations will not hurt the reliability of the electric grid . . . . The
true costs and avoidable damage of this energy source MUST be ad-
dressed by full implementation." 8 9 As Professor Cullar notes regard-
ing the comments from laypeople in his sample, they "nearly always
raise concerns that are relevant to the agency's legal mandate." 90
Most famously of late, agencies have been at the receiving end of
public comment campaigns where numerous comments flow into the
agencies from individuals. The most extreme example is the submis-
sion by individuals of multiple form letters, postcards, or e-mails to an
agency, each with identical or near-identical text.9' This type of cam-
paign is often facilitated by interest groups, which may help individu-
als prepare comments by supplying suggested text as well as electronic
portals to use in submitting those comments.92 For example, in the
first major organic food standards rulemaking, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture received over 40,000 comments, 93 and in its roadless
area rules, over 1.6 million comments, all told.9 4 The FCC's media
ownership rule generated over a million comments, the majority from
individual citizens, 95 and the Clinton Administration tobacco rule gen-
erated over 700,000 comments. 96 And as noted earlier, the Fish and
Wildlife Services received more than 640,000 e-mail comments on
whether to list the polar bear as a threatened species.97 These com-
ments may include technical issues as well as statements of policy and
value preference.
89 John Kersting, Comment on Proposed Rule: Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, REGLJATIONS.GcOV, http://www.regu-
lations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0491 -0165 (last visited June 12, 2011).
90 Cu6llar, supra note 60, at 414.
91 The Clinton Administration's tobacco rule generated 700,000 pieces of mail, including
"more than 500 different types of form letters." Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribu-
tion of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,396, 44,418 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, and 897).
92 Cf FEDERAL E-RULEMAKINc REPOR, supra note 6, at 47 ("Interest and advocacy or-
ganizations help individuals filter the massive stream of regulatory activity, so that they can focus
on, learn about, and engage with specific issues of relevance to them .... [Such organizations
can also] explore innovative forms of individual and collective participation.").
93 National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at
7 C.FR. pt. 205) ("The public submitted 40,774 comments on the proposed rule.").
94 Special Areas: Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3248 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to
be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
95 See Benjamin, supra note 15, at 908 & nn.41 & 43.
96 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,418 ("Altogether, the agency received
more than 700,000 pieces of mail, representing the views of nearly 1 million individuals.").
97 FEDERAL F-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 54 n.127.
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One could imagine that some of these comments are irrelevant.
Sometimes issues are legally out-of-bounds in a rulemaking, such as
when a statute evidences a clear preference that an activity continue,
subject to regulation, while the comments favor a complete ban, or
where the statute requires that an activity be regulated regardless of
cost and the comment asks the agency to weight cost heavily.98 The
broad phrasing of many statutes, however, makes this possibility much
less likely, and in his study, Professor Cudllar found that the vast ma-
jority of comments filed were indeed relevant. 99
How do agencies respond to all these comments? At present,
agency response to comments-particularly numerous value-laden
comments from large numbers of individuals-seems both limited and
focused on technical and sophisticated comments. Professor Cu6llar's
empirical work suggests that the most sophisticated comments, which
likely are also the ones that advance the most technical concerns, are
the ones that get the most response from agencies.'" In his study,
sophisticated comments tended to get more attention from agency of-
ficials whether they were submitted by individual members of the
public or by organized groups, but organized groups submitted sophis-
ticated comments far more often than individual members of the pub-
lic.IOI Sophisticated comments got more attention even though they
did "not always mention the range of concerns raised by comments
from the lay public." 102
By contrast, however, agencies have so far appeared fairly resis-
tant to significantly engaging value-focused comments. Consider the
Consumer Product Safety Commission's ("CPSC") recent rulemaking
setting standards for infant bath seats to reduce infant drownings. 03
CPSC received public comments arguing that a ban would be more
appropriate. They stated that the risk to infants of being left alone by
98 For example, public views on whether the polar bear should be listed as a threatened
species might well be irrelevant under the Endangered Species Act, which requires the Interior
Department to make the finding based on threats to the existence of the species and habitat
availability, and "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to
him . . . taking into account [governmental] efforts . . . to protect such species." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006).
99 Cudllar, supra note 60, at 414.
00 Id.
101 Id. ("Dramatic differences exist in the extent of specialized knowledge and technical
sophistication reflected in comments from organized interests versus those from individual mem-
bers of the public.").
102 Id. at 414-15.
103 Safety Standard for Infant Bath Seats, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,691 (June 4, 2010) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1215).
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a parent in the tub was not worth the risk of offering greater choices
to parents regarding how to bathe their children.'0 4 The CPSC did not
offer a response.105 Somewhat more impressive was the Federal Avia-
tion Administration's ("FAA") response to a comment in a minor
rulemaking concerning certain airplanes whose wing attachment fit-
tings were liable to crack.106 The FAA proposed to require replacing
cracked fittings and using reinforcement kits.'07 A commenter sug-
gested repetitive inspections as a way of addressing safety at a lower
cost, and the FAA responded, "[t]he FAA's policy is to provide cor-
rective action . . . . The FAA has determined that long-term opera-
tional safety will be better assured by design changes that remove the
source of the problem, rather than by repetitive inspections or other
special procedures." 0 s Although the agency did not offer much of a
reason in response to the comment,109 at least it did respond.
Agencies similarly seem unmoved even when the volume of com-
ments is very large. Agencies have frequently treated these multiple
postings briefly and with little real engagement. Form letters, post-
cards, or e-mails, if they are present among the comments, are "some-
times derided by agency staff."110 As Professors Schlosberg,
Zavetoski, and Shulman have reported, "[i]nterviews with agency rule
writers show that agencies do not value and often openly resent form
letters.""' Very frequently, a notice of final rule will note the filing of
large numbers of public comments, but will pass over those comments
lightly, saving detailed responses for more sophisticated or technical
comments.1 2 In general, rulemaking documents only occasionally ac-
104 Compare Donald Mayes, Comment on Proposed Rule: Requirements for Accreditation
of Third Party Conformity: Third Party Testing for Certain Children's Products; Infant Bath
Seats, REGULATIONS.GOv, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CPSC-2009-0064-00
14.1 (last visited June 12, 2011) (opposing rule), with Howell Johnson, Comment on Proposed
Rule: Safety Standard for Infant Bath Seats, REGULATIONS.oov, http://www.regulations.gov/#!
documentDetail;D=CPSC-2009-0064-0003 (last visited June 12, 2011) ("[1] believe [infant bath
seats] can be made safe and serve a vital purpose ... but that as they are currently, there is more
risk than benefit.").
105 See Safety Standard for Infant Bath Seats, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,691.
106 Airworthiness Directives; SOCATA-Groupe AEROSPATIALE Models TB1O and
TB200 Airplanes, 63 Fed. Reg. 19,178 (Apr. 17, 1998) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 39).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Cf Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 635 (1995).
110 Cudllar, supra note 60, at 421-22 (noting that form letters may be sent in the hope of
provoking congressional attention).
Ill David Schlosberg, Steve Zavestoski & Stuart Shulman, Deliberation in E-Rulemaking?
The Problem of Mass Participation, in ONLINE DELIBERATION: DESIGN, RESEARCH, AND PRAC-
TICE 133, 143 (Todd Davies & Seeta Peia Gangadharan eds., 2009).
112 Professor Cualar supplies one example. See Cudllar, supra note 60, at 422 n.39 (citing
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knowledge the number of lay comments and the sentiments they ex-
press; they very rarely appear to give them any significant weight.
Take a National Park Service ("NPS") rulemaking regarding the
permissibility of personal water craft (more often known as jet skis) in
Assateague National Seashore. Beginning in 2000, the default rule
was to restrict jet skis in national parks and seashores until the NPS
made specific "appropriateness" determinations on a park-by-park
basis." 3 Accordingly, in 2002, the NPS published a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking to maintain the closure in most of Assateague Na-
tional Seashore, but to permit jet skis in two significant areas of the
park closest to access from the populated areas of Chincoteague Is-
land, Virginia, and Ocean City, Maryland.' 14 The agency stated that it
received 7600 comments.' 1 5 Of them, the agency stated that "7,264
support a complete ban on [jet ski] use within the national seashore
boundary. An additional 43 individuals support banning [jet ski] use
within the entire National Park System."1' 6 Approximately 170 com-
ments supported the rule." 7 The NPS then turned to analyzing sev-
eral issues raised in the comments regarding safety, crowding, and
other technical issues presented by the proposed restriction. In the
final rule, the agency never engaged at all the overwhelming number
of comments opposing any jet ski access in the park."'
Concession Contracts, 65 Fed. Reg. 20,630, 20,631 (Apr. 17, 2000) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.
51)) (implying that the National Park Service needed only to respond to "non-duplicative"
comments).
113 See Assateague Island National Seashore, Personal Watercraft Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,371,
32,372 (May 30, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7).
114 Id. (noting that the proposed rule was published May 6, 2002). The two areas are at the
north end of the park, near Ocean City, Maryland, and a significant area known as Horsehead
Marsh, near Chincoteague Island, Virginia. For maps of the areas, see Personal Watercraft
(PWC) Closure Areas, Chincoteague, VA, NAT'L PARK SERv., U.S. DEP'T INTRIOR, http://www.
nps.gov/asis/planyourvisitupload/PWCSouth.pdf (last visited June 12, 2011); Personal Watercraft
(PWC) Closure Areas, Sinepuxent Bay, NAT'L PARK SERv., U.S. DEP'r INTERIOR, http://www.
nps.gov/asis/planyourvisit/upload/PWCNorth.pdf (last visited June 12, 2011).
115 Assateague Island National Seashore, Personal Watercraft Use, 68 Fed. Reg. at 32,372.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Somewhat cryptically, the NPS did state that comments referring to the environmental
assessment "have been identified and responded to in the Finding of No Significant Impact." Id.
It is not clear whether those comments might even encompass the over 7000 ban-favoring com-
ments. In any event, that finding, prepared in compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act, is not readily obtainable, and so it would have been very difficult for the public to
discover whether the agency responded to these comments. Id. at 32,375 ("A copy of that find-
ing may be obtained by contacting the Superintendent of Assateague Island National
Seashore.").
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Another well-known NPS rule, on snowmobile access in Yellow-
stone National Park and the Grand Tetons, similarly failed to engage
public comments adequately. 119 When the NPS proposed restricting
snowmobile access, it received 360,000 comments on its Draft Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement, eighty percent of which reportedly sup-
ported a ban on snowmobiles.120 Nonetheless, the NPS ended up
expanding snowmobile access.
Similarly, in a rule regarding grazing policy, the Bureau of Land
Management's ("BLM") treatment of the large number of lay com-
ments it received was perfunctory at best. BLM noted that it had re-
ceived over 18,000 comment letters and electronic communications,
and it stated:
Most of the comments were form letters or emails. An exact
count of the comments is not available because of the large
amount of duplication among the comments due to individu-
als or entities submitting identical comments multiple times
or via different media. We did not attempt to keep track of
all the duplications, although we observed many. 1
Professor Stephen Zavestoski and his coauthors discuss the U.S.
Forest Service's roadless area rule.122 That rule received 1.2 million
comments, and the Forest Service explicitly noted that its content
analysis team would make "no attempt to treat input as if it were a
vote."12 3 Of the comments, some felt the rule did not go far enough;
others felt it went too far.124 Similarly, with respect to the FCC's me-
dia ownership rules, "[t]he overwhelming sentiment against the rules
in the comments appears to have had no effect."12 5
119 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY Po-
icy 90 (6th ed. Supp. 2009-2010).
120 See Special Regulations; Areas of the National Park System, 68 Fed. Reg. 51,526 (pro-
posed Aug. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. 7); BREYER ET AL., supra note 119, at 90
(reporting that eighty percent of comments favored ban); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Flooded
with Comments, Official Plug Their Ears, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 2002, at C4.
121 Grazing Administration-Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. 39,402, 39,403 (July 12,
2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100).
122 Stephen Zavestoski, Stuart Shulman & David Schlosberg, Democracy and the Environ-
ment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen Participation in Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 Sci., TECH. &
Hum. VALUES 383, 386-88 (2006).
123 Id. at 387.
124 Id. at 386.
125 Benjamin, supra note 15, at 908. The EPA also received approximately 500,000 public
comments in response to its 2005 "Clean Air Mercury Rule" for coal-fired power plants. Stan-
dards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generat-
ing Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,608 (May 18, 2005). A small subset of those comments
received an agency response in the final rule document. Id. ("Some of the more significant
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1365 2010-2011
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
An impressive counterexample to the pattern of agency dismis-
siveness of public comments can be found in a 1997 National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") rulemaking regarding
whether to permit dealerships to install on-off switches for airbags.126
The agency received 700 comments, 600 of them from members of the
general public.127 Comments from the general public in that rulemak-
ing "almost universally favored allowing air bag deactivation for any-
one who wants it," on grounds of "personal choice," emphasizing "the
danger that they believe air bags pose and many [comments] men-
tion[ing] media reports that they had seen."l 28 The agency's view,
however, was that the public was not properly assessing the risks and
benefits of airbags and that only a very few conditions warranted
airbag deactivation on safety grounds.129 Rather than either follow
the preferences of the commenters or dismiss them out of hand, the
agency convened focus groups regarding whether enhanced informa-
tion provided to the public could address fears about airbags.o30 In the
sessions, the focus groups "emphasized that public information and
education would reduce misconceptions about air bags."l31 Following
the focus groups, the agency sharply restricted the availability of on-
off switches-but added a "public education information campaign to
put air bag risks and benefits into proper perspective."13 2
Another might be the Agriculture Department's National Or-
ganic Program rulemaking, finalized in December 2000, at the very
end of the Clinton administration.133 In deciding that foods certified
comments ... are addressed in this preamble."). The agency responded to "300 unique public
comments" in a separate document published only in the regulatory docket, but provided no
discussion or description of the other over 400,000 comments. See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY
PLANNING & STANDARDS, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC
COMMENTS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO: REVISION OF DECEMBER 2000 REGULATORY FINDING
ON THE EMISSIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENER-
ATING UNITS AND THE REMOVAL OF COAL- AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENER-
ATING UNITS FROM THE SECTION 112(c) LIsT RECONSIDERATION 10 (2006), available at http://
www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/final-com-resp_053106.pdf.
126 Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406 (Nov. 21, 1997) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 571 and 595).
127 Id. at 62,413.
128 Id. at 62,414.
129 Id. at 62,417.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 62,423.
133 National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,551 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at
7 C.F.R. pt. 205).
[Vol. 79:13431366
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as "organic" should not include irradiated foods, the agency said the
following:
The prohibition on ionizing radiation in the final rule is
based solely on consumer preference as reflected in the over-
whelming public comment stating that organically handled
foods should not be treated in that manner.134
The rule could be understood as responding to public discomfort
with radiation, though the issue could also be understood as technical:
this is the meaning that "organic" generally conveys to the public.
Finally, the Department of Health and Human Services' Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA")135 Privacy
Rule of late 2000 appears to be a less attractive example of an agency
responding to public preferences. 136 In finalizing that rule in late 2000,
the agency responded to the nearly 52,000 public comments it re-
ceived, many urging more privacy protections.137 The rule has been
criticized as creating too much "red tape"138 and discouraging some
hospitals and clinics from "assist[ing medical] researchers." 139 It is dif-
ficult to conclude that the problems with the rule, however, can be
blamed solely on agency response to public preferences.14 0
Despite these latter examples, agencies generally appear to be
impatient with and unresponsive to value-focused commenting. At a
minimum, the scope of agency response to such comments is worth
further investigation. To the extent agencies are unresponsive in this
way, one cause could be agency official motivations. More likely, in-
stitutional commitments and legal requirements simply do not prompt
agencies to consider or respond to these sorts of comments.14 1
134 Id. at 80,551.
135 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
136 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,566 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
137 Id. at 82,566 (noting "substantial changes to the proposal in response to those
comments").
138 Carl E. Schneider, HIPAA-cracy, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 10, 10; see
Stephen K. Phillips, A Legal Research Guide to HIPAA, J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L., July 2010, at
134, 147; see also Jack Brill, Note, Giving HIPAA Enforcement Room to Grow: Why There
Should Not (Yet) Be a Private Cause of Action, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2105, 2135 (2008)
(noting that although the HIPAA privacy rule has "unfortunate adverse effects on the physician-
patient relationship and on medical research," the rules "may certainly be well worth their
costs").
139 Brill, supra note 138, at 2134.
140 Cf Schneider, supra note 138, at 11 ("However 'fundamental' privacy may be, HIPAA
is otiose if it promotes it ineffectively.").
141 I assume here that agency officials are generally subjectively motivated to serve the
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First, many agency rules-particularly high-profile, more contro-
versial rules-are perceived to be pretty well finalized at the notice of
proposed rulemaking stage.142 One reason that an agency position in
a proposed rule may be set in mud, if not concrete, is the public notice
requirement of the APA.143 An agency must give full public notice of
all critical matters contemplated for a final rule.1" Any rule change in
response to comments that is beyond a "logical outgrowth" of the con-
tents of the proposed rule either makes the rule vulnerable to judicial
invalidation or requires a new round of notice and comment.145 This
creates an incentive for agencies to identify and resolve as many criti-
cal issues as possible prior to the issuance of the notice of proposed
rulemaking,146 and a number of observers have suggested that agency
practice conforms to theory on this point.147 The consequence is that
only the most technical comments, such as those that might result in
public interest, and that in any event, a structure which holds the agency accountable for proper
action would help blunt any contrary motivations. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND
PUBLIC INTERESTS. THE POssIBILIr OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 92-96 (2008) (dis-
cussing motivations of regulatory officials); Cu6lar, supra note 60, at 428 (finding it unsurprising
that "staff may be (at least in part) genuinely interested ... in responding to intelligible concerns
raised by commenters"); Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1565-66 (suggesting that agency officials
may seek to maximize post-work opportunities); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reas-
sessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 262 (2009) (officials
may seek to shirk); Stewart, supra note 31, at 1681-84 (discussing process of determining public
interest, with officials as brokers); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1565-74.
142 Wagner, supra note 67, at 1367 (arguing that judicial review provides agencies with
strong incentive to have rule in near-final state at proposed-rule stage). As Professor Edward
Rubin has observed, the notice requirement is essentially a judicial concept aimed at giving "fair
treatment of particular individuals," in tension with the point of rulemaking, which is a "policy
process that should involve the collection of new information and the use of that information to
design optimal solutions." Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 113 (2003). Professor Susan Webb Yackee found, how-
ever, in her study of more run-of-the-mill administrative rulemakings, that agencies did appear
to revise final rules in response to comments. Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth
Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 105 (2006); see also FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note
6, at 57 (noting "frequent complaint" that public participation comes too late in process).
143 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Wagner, supra
note 67, at 1367.
146 As Professor Edward Rubin has suggested, the judicial review requirements for reason-
giving and prior notice are in tension with having rulemaking function as a genuine quasi-legisla-
tive process. They are an obstacle to agencies modifying their options and approaches freely in
response to information received from the public during rulemaking. See Rubin, supra note 142,
at 111-18.
147 See NOVECK, supra note 39, at 40-43; Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The
Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 764 (1996).
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technical changes or slight adjustments to the overall standard se-
lected by the agency, are likely to get attention during the comment
period. Values-focused comments aimed at the overall approach of
the rule are likely to be slighted.148
Prenotice participation, when it happens, is not an adequate sub-
stitute for notice-and-comment rulemaking on these issues. Agencies
do often try to engage a wide range of interested parties prior to pub-
lishing the notice of proposed rulemaking, but the involved parties
typically include a disproportionate number of regulated entities. This
may have nothing to do with "agency capture," though capture, if it
exists, may make the problem worse. Instead, regulated entity groups
possess information particularly valuable to the agency, the agency
needs their cooperation in complying with the standard once issued,
and the agency simply may have more information about whom to
call.149
In short, the danger is that the public comment process may end
up looking more like window dressing, and the precomment process is
no substitute. The filing of comments-especially with respect to
those who have participated prior to the notice of public rulemak-
ing-thus resembles less a genuine and democratic opportunity to as-
sist administrative decisionmakers and more E. Don Elliott's famous
description: "Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participa-
tion as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions-a highly styl-
ized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something
which in real life takes place in other venues."150 Those who have not
participated prenotice may find that their comments get less attention,
especially if acting on those comments would require the agency to
significantly revise the content or direction of the rule.
148 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("In determining
what points are significant, the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review must be kept in
mind. Thus only comments which, if true, raise points relevant to the agency's decision and
which, if adopted, would require a change in an agency's proposed rule cast doubt on the reason-
ableness of a position taken by the agency. Moreover, comments which themselves are purely
speculative and do not disclose the factual or policy basis on which they rest require no response.
There must be some basis for thinking a position taken in opposition to the agency is true."
(citing Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973))); see also
City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding against challenge the
EPA's "generic" response to scientific studies on radionuclides in drinking water, including its
statements that it had "reviewed the documents" and that information was "familiar to the
Agency and accordingly had already been considered").
149 Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 429 (2007).
150 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
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Second, judicial review requirements provide agencies with an in-
centive to take technical comments more seriously than value-focused
comments.151 Agencies are responsible for responding to significant
issues raised in comments, including those comments identifying a
technical difficulty with a rule or transmitting scientific information.152
In addition, in applying the arbitrary and capricious review standard,
judges often focus explicitly on the rational connection between the
"facts found" and the "choices made" by an agency in rulemaking. 53
Consequently, an agency's failure to acknowledge these sorts of issues
may be vacated on judicial review.
As to the value issues, the legal obligation for an agency to re-
spond to comments appears to have less bite. Public comments might,
for example, advocate that an agency action be relatively protective of
health, the environment, or personal privacy, that the agency should
refrain from paternalism, or that the agency should weight resource
conservation more heavily than resource use. With respect to the
agency's obligation to respond to these sorts of comments, research
has not yet uncovered an opinion in which an agency decision has
been vacated because the agency failed to consider value preferences
in public comments. And efforts to argue that agencies are obligated
to follow the weight of preferences in the comments have been
roundly-and appropriately-rejected, as with one opinion, where the
court wrote that agency rulemaking is not a process in which "the ma-
jority of commenters prevail by sheer weight of numbers."15 4
Third, compared with well-organized groups, individuals who
submit comments may have less ability to invoke forms of political
discipline (whether it is congressional or presidential oversight) and
fewer resources with which to challenge an agency action in court.
The incentive an agency has to respond to an individual's comment
thus may be smaller than the agency's incentive to respond to the
comment filed by the well-organized group.
151 Of course, the line is sometimes hard to draw, and agencies have been criticized sharply
for burying political and values issues in technical decisions. See generally Meazell, supra note
81; Wagner, supra note 67.
152 See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977);
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
153 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983); see
also Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, No. 93-CV-0694(RMU), 1996 WL 509601, at *6 (D.D.C.
Sept. 4, 1996) (vacating EPA rule in part for failure to respond to factual allegation in comment
regarding amount of national water intake).
154 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 122 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[Tjhe Commission has no obliga-
tion to take the approach advocated by the largest number of commenters.").
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Fourth, resource constraints may impede agencies from fully con-
sidering the thousands of public comments they may receive in some
rulemakings. Agencies sometimes have had to outsource or automate
the reading of at least some of these comments. 155 Agencies may use
technology to distill the comments in some way,156 as the Fish and
Wildlife Service did in analyzing public comments on its listing of the
polar bear as a threatened species.157 And one temptation is undoubt-
edly to give high-volume comments short shrift.
Finally, as one might infer, particularly from the Cu611ar study,
agency officials may see themselves as operating in an atmosphere of
rational, technocratic analysis. This may also explain why more so-
phisticated and technically focused comments receive more atten-
tion-and more responses-in the context of an agency rulemaking,
while comments that seem closer to "votes" on policy questions are
disregarded.15 8
II. CONFRONTING AGENCY RESPONSIVENESS TO
POLICY COMMENTS
The relative lack of response to these types of comments is in
significant tension with a view of rulemaking as facilitating democratic
responsiveness. If agencies are to resolve value-laden questions, such
as whether reduced pollution is worth higher electricity bills or
whether the risk presented by a convenient infant bath seat is tolera-
ble, then we must confront the way agencies apparently treat value-
laden comments, including comments from laypersons that arrive in
large volumes. One possibility is to be very clear that mass comments
expressing policy preferences should play little or no role in agency
decisionmaking. That would mean more clearly informing the public
that the agency will consider only technical comments, and that ex-
pression of policy preferences alone will receive no weight and ought
to be sent to Congress or the White House.5 9 This would give the
155 Professor Beth Noveck has suggested that agencies use "bots" to evaluate electronic
comments to identify content that is nonidentical. See Noveck, supra note 8, at 442.
156 FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 9, 53 (noting developments of tools
to help agencies process mass comments).
157 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status
for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,235 (May
15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (noting use of the "Rule-Writer's Workbench ...
analytical software" developed at the University of Pittsburgh).
158 Schlosberg, Zavestoski & Shulman, supra note 111, at 141 ("Numerous civil servants
have reported at workshops, focus groups, and interviews over the last four years that agencies
are required to respond to substantive comments but not to sheer numbers.").
159 Cf Bill Funk, The Public Needs a Voice in Policy. But is Involving the Public in
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public a greater sense of what its participation can realistically con-
tribute to agency decisions, though it also means reducing the extent
to which we view the rulemaking process as facilitating democratic
engagement.
In this Part, I propose to make an initial case for the other possi-
bility; these sorts of comments deserve more systematic consideration.
Agencies ought to engage-in some way-these comments, especially
when they arrive in large numbers. Even if they are not distilled es-
says on the agency's proposal, public comments of this sort might offer
highly useful information regarding the public's values that could be
difficult to match elsewhere. Assuming the comments are relevant
under the agency's statutory authorization, they thus may be worth
more systematic engagement.
First, public commenting communicates the public's preferences
in a far more concrete context than voting. Rather than casting a sin-
gle, undifferentiated vote for a political candidate who possesses a not
fully specified ability to affect the operation of the administrative
state, an individual who comments can express directly to the agency a
crystallized view that is specific to a concrete proposal.
Further, the recent high levels of participation in rulemaking sug-
gest that an agency might hear from many more members of the pub-
lic than it could otherwise feasibly consult. The e-rulemaking process,
especially, may prompt high levels of public participation on a focused
issue. By contrast, polling organizations that can ask focused ques-
tions of the general public typically depend on relatively small sample
sizes-several hundred or a few thousand respondents.160
And lay comments may be relatively unaffected by the sorts of
concerns that have led to complaints about "political interference" by
the President or members of Congress with agency decisions.16 1 There
is a risk of "astroturfing," when groups form that purport to-but do
not really-represent grassroots interests, potentially giving an agency
an incorrect picture of public preferences. Agencies might take steps
Rulemaking a Workable Idea? CPRBLOG (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.progressivereform.org/
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=F74D5F86-B44E-2CBB-ED1507624B63809E ("[T]elling the public they
can have a voice in the rulemaking process verges on misleading. The notice-and-comment pro-
cedure of rulemaking isn't supposed to be a political exercise.").
160 See, e.g., How Does Gallup Polling Work?, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/101872/
how-does-gallup-polling-work.aspx (last visited June 12, 2011) ("The typical sample size for a
Gallup poll, either a traditional stand-alone poll or one night's interviewing from Gallup's Daily
tracking, is 1,000 national adults . . . .").
161 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Exper-
tise, 2007 Sup. CT. REv. 51, 88; Mendelson, supra note 27. at 1141.
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to address that risk, by requiring an affirmation that the commenter is
not being paid or through restrictions on anonymous commenting.
But in general, individuals, unlike individual members of Congress,
are less likely to be in thrall to a particular interest group or to have a
short-term electoral strategy in mind.
An agency's failure to engage value-focused comments, particu-
larly mass commenting, creates a number of problems beyond the
agency's loss of potentially valuable information. Recall that agencies
are already in the business of resolving value-laden policy questions.
An agency's decision not to attend particularly closely to large num-
bers of value-laden comments filed by the public is, as noted, in ten-
sion with our ability to see the agency as democratically responsive by
virtue of its own processes.
Moreover, to the extent members of the public perceive that the
opportunities to participate are not authentic, they may be deterred
from engaging in the government process. 162 This further undermines
the process's potential to legitimate agency decisions and undermines
the extent to which the public is willing to accept the agency's ultimate
decision. 163 Systematic agency disregard for value-focused comments
threatens to create this impression, if it has not already done so.164
Finally, not responding to value-laden comments directly can un-
dermine the candor of agency decisions. Agencies will be further en-
couraged to bury value-laden or policy issues in the resolution of
scientific questions. That can complicate participation in even those
questions and undermine the transparency of the agency decisionmak-
ing process.165
Admittedly, having agency officials attend to public comments
expressing a preference for privacy, for protection, for environmental
preservation, or for the ability to choose risky products or practices is
all in some tension with our view of agencies as "repositories of signif-
162 Cf Schlosberg, Zavestoski & Shulman, supra note 111, at 142 ("[F]orm commenters are
more likely than original commenters to think that groups that organize mass mail campaigns
have the ability to change proposed rules.").
163 See FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 (noting that imbalance in
participation undermines possibility that "taking part in a governmental process may increase
acceptance of its outcome"); see also Zavestoski, Shulman & Schlosberg, supra note 122, at 390
(noting that public may develop perception that "expert scientific knowledge and jargon are
privileged," creating further obstacles to commenting from a lay perspective).
164 See Seelye, supra note 120 (newspaper coverage of Park Service snowmobile decision).
165 Meazell, supra note 81, at 752 (noting the phenomenon of "scientists inserting their own
policy choices into their analyses," which can "hinder participation and accountability because
they drown policy choices in inaccessible science"); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 23-29 (2009).
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icant substantive expertise and experience."166 This understanding of
agency function no doubt partly informs judicial opinions concluding
that agencies cannot be compelled to follow the weight of public pref-
erences expressed in a rulemaking.167
The reality, however, is that agencies are already fully engaged in
deciding value-laden questions. For those decisions to be legitimate,
we must be able to understand them as democratically responsive, and
public comment can be an important source of information on the
values agencies must weight or balance. This point was made by the
Attorney General's Committee as administrative procedure bills were
being considered in the 1940s, ultimately leading to the adoption of
the APA: "[An agency's] deliberations are not carried on in public
and its members are not subject to direct political controls as are legis-
lators .... [I]ts knowledge is rarely complete, and it must always learn
the frequently clashing viewpoints of those whom its regulation will
affect."' 68
This is not to say that an agency should tally up the total number
of comments for or against a particular issue and have that serve as a
referendum or a dispositive vote of some sort on the policy issue at
hand. The judicial opinions saying agencies need not do this are
clearly correct. Leadership can consist of knowledgeable assessment
of what is in the long-term public interest, even if that is not precisely
the same policy sought by the majority of voters. 169 Agencies may
well possess better information and make a better long-term assess-
ment of risks and benefits than individual commenters. 170
Again, some of these concerns could be addressed if agencies
were to candidly announce they will not generally consider these sorts
of comments. But in view of the focused, crystallized and thus likely
166 See Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1994) ("Because Federal agencies are the
repositories of significant substantive expertise and experience, they are responsible for develop-
ing regulations and assuring that the regulations are consistent with applicable law, the Presi-
dent's priorities, and the principles set forth in this Executive order.").
167 See cases cited supra note 154.
168 COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 101-02 (1941); see Dean Smith, Lawmaking on Federal Lands:
Criminal Liability and the Public Property Exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, 23 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 313, 316 (2003).
169 See BRANDICE CANES-wRONE, WHO LEADS WHOM? PRESIDENTS, POLICY, AND THE
PUBLIC (2006).
170 Moreover, having the total number of comments serve as a referendum would generate
an incentive for "astroturfing." "Astroturfing" groups could overwhelm agencies with even
more form letters, e-mails, and postcards. See generally Wagner, supra note 67; see also Benja-
min, supra note 15, at 906 (noting the "potential for manipulation by interest groups" already
partially realized in e-mail commenting).
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useful nature of many of these comments, there is a case to be made
that a democratically responsive agency process should attend to, in-
corporate, and engage value-laden points, especially when they are
made in a significant number of comments. The implication is that at
times, the weight of comments could conceivably. make a difference.
For example, public preferences on the potential uses of a multiple-
use resource perhaps should have made a difference in the grazing, jet
ski, and snowmobile rules discussed earlier, particularly because they
are consistent with long-term availability of the resource.
Agencies might consider the following criteria for deciding when
multiple value-laden comments deserve especial attention: (1) com-
ments submitted are particularly numerous, (2) a particular viewpoint
represents a strong majority or a supermajority of the comments filed,
(3) the comments raise an issue relevant under the agency's statutory
authorization, (4) the comments are coherent and persuasive, and
(5) the comments point in a different direction from that considered
by the agency.
For example, especially where the comments point in a direction
different from the agency's proposed path, such comments have to be
understood as an important signal-perhaps even akin to a straw
poll-that further investigation of some sort into public values and
policy direction is needed.17 1
Reasons could be given, of course, why agency officials should
not give particular weight to mass comments even if values-based
comments do receive consideration. Perhaps the use of identical or
near-identical text in a comment implies that a comment does not con-
vey the commenter's genuinely held view. Identical text surely under-
mines the impression that an individual is communicating her deeply
held convictions. But that does not make the comment content-free.
After all, the vast majority of these comments are not anonymous, and
so the sending individual knows the comment is attributable to her.
The individual is likely to press "send" only if the suggested text rea-
sonably corresponds to the individual's views. Both suggested text
and the availability of an electronic portal, might simply be under-
stood as the interest group's effort to lower participation costs and
thereby increase public engagement. At worst, the group's suggestion
of text appears to boil down the range of public views to a sort of
"least common denominator." Such a comment still does convey
17, But see 2 0. HENRY, A Ruler of Men, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 0. HENRY 944, 948
(Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1953) (1899) ("A straw vote ... only shows which way the hot air
blows.").
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more content to the agency than, say, allowing individuals to vote out-
right or to click "Like" in the manner of a Facebook-type site, though
that may not be far behind.17 2 In any event, some groups now appear
to be encouraging commenters to individualize comments submitted
through electronic portals.173
It might also be said that a collection of forty thousand-or one
hundred thousand-comments sent in from portals on public interest
websites might not be representative of public views. 174 They might
represent just the views of those groups' members, not others, and
perhaps might even be slanted towards the interests of relatively
wealthy individuals, who have readier access to the Internet. 75 Pro-
fessor Stuart Benjamin has suggested that public opinion polls with
"randomized samples" might be a better substitute.176
Public polls focused on a particular question, however, typically
have much smaller groups of participants and they too have difficul-
ties with nonresponders.'7 7 Meanwhile, even if not perfectly represen-
tative of the public at large, the level of participation in mass
commenting is surely an improvement over a nation without citizen
engagement. This is especially true given the general under-
representation of diffuse beneficiary groups. Public comment cam-
paigns may serve to roughly counterbalance the long-time advantage
enjoyed by regulated entities.
Admittedly, not all diffuse groups of regulatory beneficiaries may
be equally successful in overcoming participation barriers, so the
172 Consider that Cornell's e-Rulemaking Initiative, which despite other statements dis-
couraging vote-like comments, still invites members of the public to "vote" on which issues are
most important for an agency to address. See generally REGULATION Room, http://www.regula-
tionroom.org (last visited June 12, 2011).
173 See, e.g., SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org (last visited June 12, 2011).
174 Cf Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regu-
latory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-Gov'T. 41, 58 (2006) (containing the following heading: "Mass E-Mail
Campaigns May Do More Harm than Good if They Make It Harder to Find the Useful Com-
ments or Lower the Estimation of the Public Role in the Minds of Regulators.").
175 Benjamin, supra note 15, at 905.
176 Id. In addition, while randomized public opinion polls might be useful tools, it may be
time-consuming to devise one specific to a particular proposed rule.
177 Concern might also be expressed that the comments represent a rough cut at the value
question, rather than a fully engaged dialogue or discussion, and so they are an inferior way to
resolve a question of public value compared with a discussion that takes place inside the agency,
the White House, or within Congress. A similar criticism might be leveled against polls or elec-
tions, which represent an even rougher cut at values. As noted elsewhere, some effort is under-
way to create a dialogue as part of the commenting process. See supra note 39 and
accompanying text; see also Farina, supra note 44, at 410-12. At a minimum, however, such
comments are surely a sufficient "rough cut" to justify particular effort to prompt a focused
dialogue with the public or with politically responsive institutions.
[Vol. 79:13431376
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agency may still need to consider the possibility that it may not be
hearing from every group of interested individuals. 178 But that hardly
seems a reason to disregard extensive participation when it is present.
Again, the recommendation here is not for agencies to add up the
number of comments for or against a particular position, but instead
to recognize the possibility that public views, as expressed in com-
ments, point in an unexpected direction or a direction contrary to the
agency's initially preferred policy. This should prompt the agency to
use additional procedures to engage public views or at a minimum to
engage in more extended deliberation, possibly including Congress or
the White House.
What might that further assessment or deliberation look like? A
range of alternatives deserves debate and experimentation; I will men-
tion three at this point. The agency or other executive branch entities
might conduct targeted opinion polling. Conceivably focus group dis-
cussions also could be used to confirm the presence and intensity of
public views and whether they might be addressed through different
methods, as NHTSA did in its rulemaking on airbag deactivation.179
Professors Cu6llar and Noveck have advocated for the use of ran-
domly selected civil juries to provide agencies with input on values
issues embedded in rulemaking-random selection to increase the
chances that a particular civil jury's views will be representative.s 0
Although this suggestion seems promising, the group's very small
size-as with some focus groups-may limit its ability to replicate the
range of views that otherwise might be expressed in a notice-and-com-
ment process or in a larger institution.
Finally, a significant number of comments in a rulemaking might
also prompt an agency to elevate the issue within the executive
branch, generating an active-and ideally, a transparent-discussion
among high-level executive branch officials regarding the appropriate
policy. The results of any such endeavors or other reforms could and
should be summarized in the final rulemaking and the agency's rea-
sons for the policy choice in the final rule explained.' 8'
Relatedly, agencies might take procedural steps to increase the
usefulness of lay and value-focused public commenting. For example,
178 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
180 NOVECK, supra note 39, at 152-53; Cu611ar, supra note 60, at 491. Professor Wagner has
made a number of other proposals, including appointing advocates for underrepresented inter-
ests, imposing restrictions on comment size, and insulating some stages of agency deliberations
to avoid deluging agencies with imbalanced information. Wagner, supra note 67, at 1414-27.
181 Mendelson, supra note 27, at 1127.
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agencies could reshape their rulemaking notices by more often using
focused questions, as agencies sometimes do now.182 This might result
in more valuable reactions from the lay public on questions of core
values and prioritization. Agencies could also regularly provide infor-
mation to the public on what makes for a higher quality, more persua-
sive comment. Further, to address the concern that by the proposed
rule stage, a rule is a fait accompli, undermining the value of public
participation,1 3 agencies should be encouraged to use the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking process as a means to solicit value
preferences prior to embarking on a more specific rule. We might also
consider a streamlined process by which additional notices or modi-
fied notices might be easily published as amendments to the original
notice of proposed rulemaking. This might remove a disincentive to
agencies more fully considering a wide range of comments. Finally, an
agency might take steps to minimize the risk of astroturfing, as dis-
cussed above, such as by requiring an affirmation that the commenter
has not been paid and announcing that anonymous comments will re-
ceive less weight, particularly when such comments purport to be in-
formed by an individual's own experience.184 If an agency barred
anonymous comments, it could on request redact a commenter's name
at the time it posts the comment electronically.
What might be the best way to ensure that agencies pay attention
to lay comments on value-laden issues? Congress, of course, might
provide specific instructions of some sort if the level of lay comment-
ing reaches a particular threshold. Judicial enforcement is always
tempting, since individual access to the courthouse to hold an agency
accountable is sometimes easier to get compared with access to Con-
gress or the White House, but interpreting the APA to require agency
responsiveness to comments on value questions would create some
special problems. Suppose an agency action were to be subject to va-
catur on the grounds that the agency failed to give adequate weight to
comments on value matters, so that the agency action was then
deemed "arbitrary and capricious." Or the action were to be chal-
lenged for the agency's failure to give an adequate explanation, violat-
ing the APA's concise statement of basis and purpose requirement.
182 The Department of Transportation employed this technique in a recent notice of a
"public listening session." See Hours of Service of Drivers, 76 Fed. Reg. 5324, 5325 (Jan. 31,
2011) (seeking "data and answers relating to the following issues and questions" ranging from
"patterns of work for night drivers" and views on whether drivers who drive between midnight
and 6 a.m. should have less duty time "to provide a longer period to obtain sleep").
183 See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
184 John Reitz, E-Government, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. (SuPP.) 733, 745 (2006).
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Resolving such claims could require judges to develop a notion of "ad-
equate weight" or adequate response in the context of value-laden
comments-ultimately an issue with political implications that judges
would seem ill equipped to evaluate. Moreover, some judges might be
tempted to use this sort of judicial review process to implement per-
sonal value preferences.85 Instead, unless Congress has provided spe-
cific statutory instructions, judicial review under the APA on these
matters ought to be limited to requiring agencies to give some ac-
knowledgement of significant views expressed through lay comments,
and courts then should defer to the content of any subsequent re-
sponse from the agency.
Besides minimal judicial review, plus the possibility of more spe-
cific congressional instruction, the best option would seem to be self-
regulation by the executive branch.186 By internal agency rule, gui-
dance, or executive order, agencies could commit to weigh layperson
comments in a particular way or to conduct additional proceedings if
layperson comments suggest that the public does not support the bal-
ance of values proposed by the agency. While self-government de-
pends on an institution's own commitment and good will,'87 rather
than accountability to an outside institution, it may nonetheless be a
very straightforward way to accomplish these goals. Some accounta-
bility could be provided if the agency is required (as it might be in
judicial review) to be transparent about its response to significant
levels of public comment. The agency could be required to give the
comments some consideration and provide its reasons for giving the
weight that it did. 88 Disclosure and transparency-and ultimately,
electoral accountability for getting the answers wrong or ignoring the
public-are the best incentives for an agency to be democratically re-
sponsive, not just to executive supervision, but to the views of the
public expressed through the administrative process.
185 Cf Mendelson, supra note 27, at 1171.
186 Cf. Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer or "The Decider"? The President in Adminis-
trative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704 (2007) (noting how agency officials conduct them-
selves may have a lot to do with what they think they are supposed to do).
187 Cf Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MicH. L. REv. 737. 783-84
(2004) (documenting low agency compliance rates with the Federalism Executive Order).
188 An acceptable public reason, for example, could be that the agency's leadership,
through the process of executive review of rulemaking, is convinced that the outcome is consis-
tent with the views of the President.
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CONCLUSION
If we want internal agency processes to be a source of democratic
responsiveness and accountability, we must give greater thought to
the role agency officials reasonably can play and how they respond to
public participation in rulemaking. As part of this evaluation, we
must more clearly acknowledge that the questions agencies answer-
and have answered for some time-involve critical questions of value,
not just expertise. Meanwhile, with the advent of e-rulemaking, pub-
lic participation seems to be on the rise, and innovations seem likely
to lower its cost and prompt more of an online dialogue either among
commenters or between commenters and agency officials. A prelimi-
nary look suggests that many public comments, even if not technical,
are relevant to the questions that agencies must resolve, but the agen-
cies are not systematically engaging those comments.
We should strongly encourage agencies to engage comments on
the value-laden questions more seriously, including the comments of
lay persons submitted in large numbers. We should also reform, at
least somewhat, the legal environment surrounding rulemaking to in-
crease its potential to make agency decisionmaking democratically re-
sponsive. Alternatively, agencies should more candidly acknowledge
how they handle public comments. At a minimum, the time is ripe for
investigation, debate, and experimentation regarding the extent to
which value-focused comments are made in rulemaking, the way
agencies typically treat them, and the manner in which agencies weigh
mass comments, particularly comments that relate to questions of
value. 89 All this is necessary if we are to realize rulemaking's promise
of a wider democratic dialogue.
189 Further experimentation is undoubtedly required. Cf Cu6llar, supra note 60, at 417
("[R]egulators could systematically experiment with, and compare, different methods for blend-
ing public input with expert opinions about risk and science.").
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